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1998/Doe v. Unocal
I. INTRODUCTION

More American-based multinational corporations are doing business in third
world nations as the world economy becomes increasingly global.' Such multi-

national corporations provide direct foreign investment to developing nations.2 The
political structure of the developing nation often dictates that the American-based

firm must work in conjunction with a private or government-run corporation in the
host state.3 This has led to many unique problems for multinational corporations
doing business in nations with unsettled socio-political environments.4 A U.S.

multinational corporation aligning itself with a governmental entity in a joint
venture may find itself unwittingly brought before a United States court for deter-

mination of liability for torts committed by the foreign government in furtherance
of the venture.5 In Doe v. Unocal, Unocal, a U.S. multinational corporation, found
itself in this very predicament. In Unocal,the district court labeled Unocal a "slave

trader" because of Unocal's partnership with the oppressive Myanmar government
in developing a gas pipeline.6 The court found jurisdiction against Unocal under the
7
Alien Tort Claims Act.

1. See Kojo Yelpaala, Strategy and Planning in Global Product Distribution- Beyond the Distribution
Contract, 25 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 839, 841-42 (1994) (describing the proliferation of Multtinational
Corporations in the world economy).
2.
See George Thomas Ellinidis, ForeignDirect Investment in Developing andNewly LiberalizedNations,
4 D.C. LJ. INT'L L. & PRAc. 299, 300-01 (1995) (setting forth how investment in such nations has grown from
US$12.5 billion (U.S.) in 1985 to US$48.9 billion in 1993).
3.
David W. Leebron, Just Winners and Losers: The Application of Game Theory to CorporateLaw and
Practice:A Game Theoretic Approach to the Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment and the Multinational
Corporation, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 305, 311 (1991) ("Foreign investment in most developing countries typically
involves the state as an active party.").
4. See Ellinidis,supra note 2, at 300-01. Some examples include: expropriation, currency inconvertibility,
and losses as a result of war or political violence and insurrection. Id.
5.
See generally Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. §1350 (West 1993) (providing jurisdiction in United
States courts for aliens suing for a tort in violation of international law).
6.
Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 890-92 (D. Cal. 1997).
7.
Id. Myanmar, formerly Burma, is a nation of 46 million people and has a provisional military
government. WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS, 801 (Robert Famighetti et al. eds. 1997). It was one of the
wealthiest countries in Southeast Asia until a dictatorship isolated the country from the world economy. Id. A group
of military officers, frustrated with the lack of economic development, successfully took power in a coup,
culminating in the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) taking power in 1988. Thomas S. Mulligan,
Myanmar Official Says Sanctions Not Hurting Growth, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1997, at DI. In 1990, free elections
were held, and the country voted in the National League for Democracy, the opposition party lead by Nobel Peace
Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi. WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS, 802 (Robert Famighetti et al. eds. 1997).
However, SLORC would not relinquish power to the elected official, and instead placed Aung San Suu Kyi under
house arrest for four years, and imprisoned over 1,000 of her supporters. Mulligan, supra. SLORC, the current
government, is internationally known for its human rights violations, including relocation of entire villages, theft
of property and enslavement of village residents, as well as general assault, rape and torture. Unocal Corp., 963
F. Supp. at 883.
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Part II of this Casenote briefly explains the historical background of the Alien
Tort Claims Act, and case law leading up to the decision in Doe v. Unocal.' Also
discussed is the historical development of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
and the Act of State doctrine. Part II provides a detailed look at the court's opinion
and reasoning in Doe v. Unocal. Part IV dissects and critiques the opinion in light

of the Alien Tort Claims Act and Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, as well as
prudential concerns incorporated in the Act of State doctrine. Part V concludes with

a discussion of the environment that multinational corporations will find themselves
competing in if other courts adopt the reasoning in Doe v. Unocal.
II. BACKGROUND

A. HistoricalBackground

Corporations that engage in third world development projects often encounter
governments without democratic traditions and Western notions of human rights.
Often, natural resources are a prime source of potential revenues for developing
countries. 9 Most likely, the resource will be developed through a joint venture between a multinational corporation and the foreign government.' 0

Multinational corporations fear that they may be held legally responsible for the
acts of the sovereign government through no direct fault of the corporation."1 Such
a fear was realized with the decision in Doe v. Unocal." The court failed to
recognize that the remedies available to the corporation as against the sovereign are

non-existent: the government dictates, therefore it is.13 As such, the corporation has
limited ability to alter this relationship. Absent governmental prohibition against
conducting business in or with a foreign government, U.S. companies should be free
to do business with the government. At some point the liability of the corporation

8. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 880.
9.
See Burns H. Weston, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and the Deprivation of
Foreign-owned Wealth, 75 AJ.I.L. 437, 449 n.61 (1981) (discussing how every state has sovereignty over its

natural resources, as well as any exploitation or economic gain derived from them). On the international level,
developing countries have used this as a reason to be excused from state responsibility under international law. Id.
at 449 n.62.
10. Leebron, supra note 3, at 340. Leebron suggests several reasons that a host country (the foreign
government) would want to create ajoint venture with an outside multinational. Id. The host country may want to
have continual monitoring and participation in decisions which may have ramifications in its country; the host
country may want to have access to the superior information gathering skills of the multinational; and it may want
to expropriate the investment. Id. at 340-41.
11. See infrapart I.C.2. (discussing application of the Alien Tort Claims Act to private companies for torts
committed by foreign government).
12. See infra part III.C.2. (describing how Unocal, a private company, is not immune from suit under the
Alien Tort Claims Act for torts committed by foreign government).
13. See Leebron, supra note 3. at 311-12. Leebron discusses how a state commitment may not be "credible"
since a state can choose to not enforce its own commitment. Id. at 311. The article also points out how a state can
simply choose to change the rules of the game, since it is the sole force of law within its territory. Id. at 312.
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under American tort law must have its limit. Such limits should not be defined by

radical expansion of existing liability acts such as the Alien Tort Claims Act. The
proper remedy lies in the political determination that the activities of the foreign
government are so oppressive that 4U.S. businesses are denied any opportunity to
conduct business with that nation.
B. Development ofAlien Tort Claims Act

The Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), enacted in 1789, has rarely been used as
a basis for liability.5 The Act provides federal jurisdiction for the adjudication of
claims alleging torts committed against aliens (i.e., non-U.S. citizens) in violation

of the law of nations.1 6 The United States Supreme Court has yet to give a definitive
17
interpretation of the statute, and there exists a paucity of cases in the lower courts.
Courts have generally held that commonly recognized violations of the law of
nations are actionable under the Act. 8 Courts tended to focus on the types of

violations of international law actionable under the ATCA, rather than on the
liability of private actors for such wrongs.
The Second Circuit in 1980 first recognized jurisdiction for torture under the
ATCA in Filartigav. Pena-Irala.t9 The court extensively analyzed the definition
of the "law of nations," and concluded that official torture perpetrated under color

of law violated the law of nations. 20 The same circuit in a 1995 decision, Kadic v.
Karadzic,2t focused primarily on the requirement of state action in violating the law
14. See generally, MICHAEL P. MALLOY, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND U.S. TRADE (1990 & Supp. 1996)
(stating that the imposition of sanctions against such governments has been a long-standing tool of American
domestic and foreign political policies to bring about democratic reforms). For example, sanctions have been used
effectively against oppressive governments in China and South Africa. Id. Limited U.S. sanctions were imposed
on Myanmar which prohibited new investment by U.S. persons, but not by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. persons.
Id. See Executive Order No. 13,047, 62 Fed. Reg. 28, 301 (1997); see also infra Part IV.D. (discussing the
executive and legislative response to the situation in Myanmar).
15. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995). The Act has not been widely used because the
statute requires "violation of the law of nations" as a threshold matter. Filartiga v. Pena-Trala, 630 F.2d 876, 887-88
(2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 901 (1996). Many earlier cases did not involve well-established norms of
international law and hence were dismissed. Id. In addition to Filartiga,only two other cases have not been
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 793 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (discussing the application of the ATCA in these two other cases -- Bolchos
v. Darrel, 3 Fed. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) and Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961)).
16. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West 1993).
17. Eastman Kodak Company v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078, 1120 (D. Fla. 1997).
18. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,442 U.S. 901 (1996).
19. Id. at 877. In Filartiga,the court found jurisdiction under the ATCA when the Inspector General of the
Paraguan Police tortured and killed the son of a political dissident. Id.
20. Id. at 880. The law of nations is said to consist of customs and usages of civilized nations, which are
interpreted through the works ofjurists and commentators, as well as judicial decisions recognizing such laws. Id.
The court remarked that the standard of having the assent of "civilized nations" is a high one to prevent the
idiosyncratic application of rules upon nations. Thus, since "torture" is uniformly condemned by all nations, it is
a generally accepted usage or custom. Id. at 881.
21. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).

The TransnationalLawyer/ Vol. 11
of nations.2 2 The court made a "particularized examination of [the] offenses," in
order to determine whether a violation of the law of nations could be committed by
a private actor.' The court applied an analysis similar to that of a 42 U.S.C.A. §
1983 claim to determine state action.2 4 Under such analysis, "a private individual
acts under color of law within the meaning of § 1983 when he acts together with
state officials or with significant state aid."' The court concluded that Karadzic, as
President of Srpska, a Bosnian-Serb republic, was liable to the plaintiffs (citizens
of Srpska) for torts committed by military forces.2 The court held that as President,
Karadzic ultimately commanded the military, and thus the military tortfeasors acted
with "state aid." 27
In Doe v. Unocal, Unocal's liability under the ATCA turned on the court's
interpretation of Unocal's status as a "state actor" for purposes of the Act. As will

be discussed infra, this determination has startling ramifications for multinational
companies doing business in third world nations, where oppressive governments are

common.2
C. Development of Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and Act of State
Doctrine

Enacted in 1976, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (hereinafter "FSIA")
grants immunity to foreign states from jurisdiction of federal and state courts in the

U.S., subject to several exceptions. 29 One commonly invoked exception is the "commercial activity" exception, which provides that a foreign state loses its immunity

from suit in a United States' court if it engages in commercial activity, i.e., the state
in effect acts as a market participant.3 0 The court in Unocal concluded that the

22.

Id. at 241.

23. Id. at 241-44. The court methodically considered each genre of liability. Id. It concluded that private
individuals may be held liable under the ATCA for genocide and war crimes but agreed with the Filartiga court
that torture and execution require state action. Id.
24.

Id. at 244.

25. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 E3d 232,244 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922,
937 (1982)). See infra notes 96-103, 141-48 and accompanying text (discussing the state action requirement).
26. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232,236-37 (2d Cir. 1995).
27. Id. at 237. For an excellent discussion of Kadic and the expansion of the ATCA, see Alan Frederick
Enslen, Commentary,Filartiga's Offspring: The Second CircuitSignificantly Expands the Scope of the Alien Tort
ClaimsAct with its Decision in Kadic v. Karadzic, 48 ALA. L. REV. 695 (1997).

28. More than one-third of the world's governments engage in, condone, or encourage torture. Hundreds
of thousands of people have been killed by such practices, and thousands more have been intimidated into silence.
126 CONG. REc. E1444 (daily ed. April 24, 1991) (statement of Hon. Gus Yatron).
29. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1604-1605 (West 1997). The exceptions to immunity include: waiver of immunity, §
1605(a)(1); commercial activity, § 1605(a)(2); property taken in violation of international law, § 1605(a)(3);
inherited, gift, or immovable property in the United States, § 1605(a)(4); noncommercial torts occurring in the
United States, § 1605(a)(5); and maritime liens, § 1605(b). The sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over foreign
states in United States courts is through this statute. Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 611 (1992).
30. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(1) (West 1997).

365
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plaintiffs' action was not based on the commercial activity of SLORC,31MOGE and
Unocal, and thus preserved the foreign government's immune status.
Similar to the FSIA, the Act of State doctrine grounds in the principle of
separation of powers. The Act of State doctrine is a judicial recognition that courts
should not decide cases which have vast foreign policy implications, since the
Executive and Legislative branches are Constitutionally endowed with such
power.32 The Unocal court concluded that the doctrine did not bar justiciability in
this case largely because of its determination that Myanmar had no recognizable
right to torture its citizens.33

I.THE CASE
A. The Facts
Doe plaintiffs filed a class action suit against Unocal Corporation (Unocal), its
President and Chief Executive Officer, Total S.A., the Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), and the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) 3 The
oppressive government, SLORC, and the state-owned Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise, MOGE, created a joint venture with Unocal to build a gas pipeline, the
"Yadana gas pipeline project., 35 The project was instituted to transport gas and oil
from the sea to the Tenasserim region of Myanmar.36 The joint venture agreement
provided that SLORC and MOGE would provide labor and security, as well as clear
the way for the pipeline.3 7 The plaintiffs alleged that SLORC and MOGE used
forced relocation and forced labor in contravention of the law of nations to achieve
these ends. 38 Additionally, SLORC and MOGE were accused of rape and torture of
the women left behind in the villages after the men were taken away into forced
39

labor.

31. See infra notes 63-75 and accompanying text (examining the commercial activity exception under
FSIA).
32. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.
2 (giving executive branch power to make treaties and nominate and
appoint various officials); see also U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8,cl.
3 (giving power to Congress to regulate foreign
commerce to legislative branch); see also Kirkpatrick & Co. v.Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400,404
(1990) (describing the act of state doctrine "as a consequence of domestic separation of powers").
33. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 894.
34.

Id. at 883.

35. See id. at 884-85 (considering Unocal's 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss forlack of subject matterjurisdiction,
and as such all facts alleged are considered in a light most favorable to plaintiffs). Thus, any discussion of facts
from the Unocal case are based upon as yet unproven allegations. Id. at 885.
36.
37.

Id. at 883.
Id. at 896.

38. Id. at 885, 896.
39.

Id. at 884.
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B. ProceduralAspects
The plaintiffs alleged that violations of international law committed by SLORC
and MOGE were committed for the benefit of the joint venture with Unocal, ° and
sought damages in nineteen causes of action.4' The court considered Unocal's
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to join a party, and
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.4 2 The court granted the
defendant's motion in part, and denied it in part.43
C. The Opinion
The court's opinion concerned three fundamental issues. In determining
whether the court had subject-matter jurisdiction, the court first considered whether
SLORC and MOGE were immune from liability under the FSIA; second, whether
Unocal was liable under the ATCA; and finally, whether the Act of State doctrine
applied to bar adjudication of the complaint.4'
1. Myanmar Government Immune From Suit in U.S. under Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act.
The court first considered SLORC's and MOGE's liability in light of the FSIA.
The FSIA provides that" a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of
the courts of the United States and of the States," subject to exceptions set forth in
28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1605 through 1607.4s The defendant claiming immunity bears the
burden of proving that it is a sovereign state. 4, The burden of production then shifts
to plaintiff to allege facts which would provide jurisdiction by falling under one of
the exceptions. 47 Once this is accomplished, the burden shifts back to the defendant
to show that the exception does not apply.48 Thus, SLORC and MOGE bore the

40.

mat
at 883.

41. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 883. The causes of action were (1) violation of RICO; (2) forced labor,
(3) crimes against humanity; (4) torture; (5) violence against women; (6) arbitrary arrest and detention; (7) cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment; (8) wrongful death; (9) battery; (10) false imprisonment; (11) assault; (12)
intentional infliction of emotional distress; (13) negligent infliction of emotional distress; (14) negligence per se;
(15) conversion; (16) negligent hiring; (17) negligent supervision; (18) violation of California Business &
Professions Code §17200, and (19) injunctive and declaratory relief. Id. at 883-84.
42. Id. at 884.
43. Id. at 883.
44. Id. at 885-86, 889-90.
45. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1604 (West 1997). For a complete list of the exceptions, see supranote 29.
46. See Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 886 (citing Phaneuf v. Republic of Indon., 106 F.3d 302, 306 (9th
Cir. 1997) which held that defendant bears the burden of establishing its immunity and that no exception applies).
The court also says that a "public act" is not required to establish jurisdiction under the Act. Id.
47. Phaneufv. Republic of Indon., 106 F.3d 302,307 (9th Cir. 1997).
48. Id.
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burden of proving that they were a foreign state; 49 however, plaintiffs conceded this
point.50 The burden of production to show an exception shifted to plaintiffs;
however, as discussed infra, plaintiffs' allegations were not sufficient to fall within
an exception, and thus they failed to meet their burden. 5t
The commercial activity exception most concerned the Unocal court. The
commercial activity exception prevents immunity where the action is based upon
a commercial activity carried on in the U.S. by the foreign state; upon an act
performed in the U.S. in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the U.S. in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect
in the U.S.52 Plaintiffs alleged that SLORC and MOGE fell under the second and
third clauses of this exception.53
The second clause of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(2), in addition to requiring a
showing of a commercial activity, discussed infra,requires plaintiffs to show that
the claim is "basedupon an act performed in the U.S."' The court explained that
a "plaintiffs claim is 'based upon' those activities that are elements of the claim
that would entitle the plaintiff to relief."55 In Unocal, the Doe plaintiffs based their
allegations on torts committed by SLORC and MOGE, not the commercial aspects
related to the Yadana gas pipeline project.56 The second clause further requires
performance of the commercial acts on which the complaint is based to be
"performed in the U.S. '57 The court remarked that the acts which constitute
plaintiffs' tort claims were performed in Myanmar, not in the U.S., and thus
summarily disposed of the second clause of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(2).5 a
The court moved on to the third clause of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(2). 59 The third
clause requires that where the act occurs outside the U.S. in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state, the act must cause a direct effect in the
U.S. 60 The court initially seemed satisfied that the clause was met as the acts (torts
by SLORC and MOGE) occurred outside the U.S. (in Myanmar), and were per-

49. Under the definitions of FSIA, "foreign state" includes a political subdivision of a foreign state, or an
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1603(a) (West 1997).
50. Unocal Corp., 963 F Supp. at 886.
51.

Id.

52. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(2) (West 1997).
53. Unocal Corp., 963 F Supp. at 887.
54. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(2) (West 1997). Clause two of this section requires that the action be based "upon
an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere."
Accord Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F Supp. 880, 887 (D. Cal. 1997).
55. See Unocal Corp., 963 F.Supp. at 887 (quoting from Holden v. Canadian Consulate, 93 E3d 918, 920
(9"' Cir. 1996) cert.denied, 117 S.Ct. 767 (1997)).
56.
57.
58.

Id.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(2) (West 1997).
Unocal Corp., 963 . Supp. at 887.

59. Id. at 888.
60. 28 U.S.C.A. §1605 (a)(2) (West 1997). See Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp, at 888.
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formed "in connection with" a commercial activity of the foreign state (the Yadana
gas pipeline project).6 ' The court examined
the acts to determine if they constituted
62
"commercial activity" under the Act.

Abundant case law fleshes out the definition of "commercial activity" as used
in the FSIA.63 Pursuant to its statutory definition, "commercial activity" means

"either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial
transaction or act," with the commercial character of the activity being determined
by the nature of the conduct, rather than its purpose. 4 In determining whether the
commercial activity exception applies, courts characterize how the foreign state
participates in the marketplace-as a market participant or a market regulator.6 The

Supreme Court interpreted the "commercial activity" exception to have the same
definition as the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, a theory used prior to

passage of the FSIA.6 Under this definition, a foreign state is immune to sovereign
or public acts (jure imperi), but not those that are private or commercial in

character (jure gestionis).67 Thus, if a foreign state acts as a private player in the
marketplace exercising powers similar to those exercised by private citizens, the
foreign state is considered to have engaged in "commercial activity" for purposes
of the FSIA exception.68
The statute further provides that the nature of the act rather than its purpose
determines the commercial character of the act.69 Thus, the inquiry is "whether the
particular actions that the foreign state performs (whatever the motive behind them)

are the type of actions by which a private party engages in 'trade and traffic or commerce."' 70 The court in Unocal determined that though SLORC and MOGE parti-

61. UnocalCorp., 963F Supp. at 887.
62. Id. at 887-88.
63. See, eg., Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993) (explaining that commercial activity is not found
where public hospital employer turns employee over to government police to be tortured); see alsoRepublic of Arg.
v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607 (1992) (holding that issuance of bonds is commercial activity); see also Adler v. Fed.
Pub. of Nig., 107 .3d 720 (9th Cir. 1997) (deciding that entering an agreement for consideration constitutes
commercial activity); see also Holden v. Canadian Consulate, 92 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that
employment of diplomatic, civil service or military personnel is governmental and the employment of other
personnel is commercial) cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 767 (1997); see also Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Arg., 965
E2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding commercial activity where Argentina managing an Argentine corporation,
operating a hotel, and receiving profits from its operations).
64. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1603(d) (West 1997).
65. Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992). Accord Randolph v. Budget Rent-a-Car, 97
E3d 319, 324 (1996) (proposing that conduct by foreign state must be founded on commerce and be transactional
in nature).
66. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 359-60 (1993).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1603(d) (West 1997).
70. Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992). The court provides an example which makes
this distinction clear. Id. A foreign state's issuance of regulations limiting foreign currency exchange is sovereign,
since a private party cannot participate in this activity; in contrast, a foreign state's entering a contract to purchase
army boots is a commercial activity, since such an activity can be performed by private parties as well. Id.
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cipated in the market for profit motives, such motives were irrelevant. 1 The court
instead should look to the nature of the actions complained of and ascertain if they
are capable of being performed by a private actor.7 2 Here, the complaint alleged
torts committed by SLORC military and police officials in furtherance of the
Yadana gas pipeline project.' The Supreme Court has held that "exercise of the
powers of police and penal officers is not the sort of action by which private parties
can engage in commerce."7 4 Thus, the torts are not a "commercial activity" within
the meaning of the statute.75
The court next focused on the statutory construction of "in connection with. 76
Courts have interpreted the phrase to mean that the acts complained of have some
"substantive connection" or "causal link" to the commercial activity.77 The phrase
manifests an intentional difference between the first clause, and the second and
third clauses, of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(2). 78 While the first clause requires a suit to
be "based upon" a commercial activity, the second and third clauses merely require
a suit to be "based upon acts performed 'in connection with' such activity."79 The
Unocal court noted that SLORC and MOGE's actions satisfied the "in connection
with" requirement of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(2), since allegations of torture and
expropriation of property are "substantively connected" to the Yadana gas pipeline
project, the commercial activity."
Further, the court found the third clause of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(2) did not
apply as an exception to immunity because the acts caused no "direct effects" in the
United States, as required by the statutory language.81 An act meets this requirement
if "it follows as an 'immediate consequence' of the defendant's activity." 2 The
court found plaintiffs' alleged chain of causation too attenuated to be considered a
direct effect for purposes of the statute. 3 The plaintiffs suggested that forced labor
and relocation reduced the project cost, thus providing SLORC and MOGE with a

71.

Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 887.

72. Id.
73. Id. at 888.
74. UnocalCorp., 963 F. Supp. at 887 (citing Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349,361-62 (1993)),
75. Id. at 888. See infra part IV.B. (discussing effect of finding no commercial activity).
76. UnocalCorp., 963 F. Supp. at 888 n.5.
77. See Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 888 (citing Adler v. Fed. Republic of Nig., 107 F.3d 720, 726 (9th
Cir. 1997)).
78. Saudi Arabia v.Nelson, 507 U.S. 349,358 (1993).Accord Adler v. Fed. Republic of Nig., 107 F.3d 720,
726 (1997) ("All acts need not be commercial activity themselves; they must merely have been made 'in connection
with' such activity").
79. Adler v. Fed. Republic of Nig., 107 F.3d 720,726 (9th Cir. 1997).
80. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 888 n.5. The court makes this conclusory statement with no analysis. Id.
It is apparent, however, that in order to perform their obligations under the gas pipeline project, SLORC and MOGE
needed to supply labor. Id. at 896. Thus, the allegations of forced labor and relocation are "substantively connected"
with the project. Id. at 888 n.5.
81. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(2) (West 1997). See Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 888.
82. Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992).
83. Unocal Corp., 963 F.Supp. at 888.
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competitive advantage in the gas market in the United States.84 The court noted that
mere financial loss does not establish a direct effect.8 5 Thus, the commercial activity
exception 8did
not apply to SLORC and MOGE, and the FSIA provided them with
6

immunity.

2. Unocal Not Immune from Suit Under Alien Tort Claims Act

The Alien Tort Claims Act confers upon U.S. district courts original jurisdiction
in any civil action by an alien for a tort committed in violation of the law of nations
or a treaty of the United States. 7 The plaintiffs allege that torts committed by
private defendants may be based on violations of international law.88 The court
noted that it "must determine 'whether there is an applicable norm of international
law, whether it is recognizable in the United States, what its status is, and whether
it has been violated."'8 9

The "law of nations" has been subject to differing interpretations."° The law of
nations may be determined by looking to writings on public law, the general
practice of nations, and judicial decisions enforcing international law.9 Most courts
agree that its definition derives from the contemporary international community and

84. Id.
85. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 888. See Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d 699,710 (9th
Cir. 1992). Several circuits have adopted the "legally significant acts" test to determine a direct effect for purposes
of clause three of § 1605(a)(2). Adler v. Federal Republic of Nig., 107 F.3d 720, 727 (9th Cir. 1997). In applying
this test the court looks to the place where the legally significant acts giving rise to the claim occurred to determine
the place where the direct effect is located. Id. However, this test has not been expressly adopted by the Supreme
Court. Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 618. Rather, the Court outlined an "immediate consequences"
test. Id.
86. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 888.
87. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (Vest 1993).
88. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 890. International law traditionally concerned relations between nationstates, and not necessarily with private actors. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 792 n.22 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring).
89. See Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 890 (quoting from In Re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human
Rights Litigation, 978 F.2d 493, 502 (9th Cir. 1992)).
90. See Carmichael v. United Technologies Corp., 835 F.2d 109, 113 (5th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that
defining "the law of nations" is the subject of hot debate); see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d
774, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)). The
Supreme Court has stated that in determining the "law of nations,"
where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must
be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations, and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists
and commentators, who by years of labor, research, and experience, have made themselves peculiarly
well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals,
not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy
evidence of what the law really is.
Id.
91. Carmichael v. United Technologies Corp., 835 F.2d 109, 113 (5th Cir. 1988); Accord Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774,777 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring).
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not its definition in 1789.92 An international law must be specific, universal and
obligatory in order to be actionable. 93 Discussion among commentators centers on

which types of international laws meet these criteria. Four acts internationally
denounced (characterized as jus cogens norms) include: torture, summary
execution, genocide, and slavery.94 Thus, violations of jus cogens norms provide

jurisdiction under the ATCA. 95 The exact extent of state action required for
violation of these laws is unsettled.
The court first decided whether the ATCA incorporates a state action
requirement.96 The court analyzed when actions by a private individual may be
deemed actions of a state, assuming without explanation that there is some such
requirement.97 While the Supreme Court provides four approaches to determine

state action, each court makes a fact-based inquiry to determine which one(s) to
apply. 98 The Unocal court adopted the joint action approach, wherein private actors
are state actors if they are "willful participants in joint action with the state or its
agents." ' Under the joint action test, courts alternatively have examined whether
state officials and private actors "acted in concert in effecting a particular
deprivation ofconstitutional rights, ' ° or whether the state and private actors "share
a common, unconstitutional goal."' t Thus, where a "substantial degree of

92. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078, 1121 (D. Fl. 1997) (construing the ATCA in a
contemporary light). But see Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 812-14 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.,
concurring) (arguing that the definition of the "law of nations" is limited to its meaning upon passage of § 1350
in 1789).
93. Hilao v. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994).
94. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F2d 774,791 n. 20 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In contrast, courts have
been reluctant to find a violation of international law where expropriation of property was involved, as there is not
universal condemnation of such activity. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
95. See Unocal Corp., 963 F Supp. at 890 (citing In Re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights
Litigation, 978 F.2d 493, 500 (9th Cir. 1992)).
96. Id. at 890.
97. Id. The requirement of state action arose from the widely held view that international law could be
violated only by states, and not by private individuals. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 E3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995). This
has changed with respect to violations of certain international laws, such as piracy, slave trade and war crimes. Id.
These types of violations do not require state action and can be committed by private individuals. Id. However,
torture is an act that requires state action. Id.
98. See Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 890 (citing George v. Pacific-CSC Work Furlough, 91 F.3d 1227,
1230 (9th Cir. 1996), quoting from Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 394 (1995)). The four
approaches adopted by the Supreme Court for use in state action questions include: (1) public function; (2) state
compulsion; (3) nexus; and (4) joint action. Id. Under the public function approach, the court looks to whether a
private actor is exercising a traditionally exclusive governmental function. George v. Pacific-CSC Work Furlough,
91 F.3d 1227, 1230 (9th Cir. 1996). Under the nexus approach, the court looks for a sufficiently close state
involvement with the private entity's acts. Id. at 123 1. Under the state compulsion approach, the court looks to see
if the private entity acts as the state when some state law or custom requires a certain course of action. Id. at 1237.
Finally, the joint action approach is discussed in the text above. It is uncertain whether these are four separate tests,
or merely considerations to take into account in looking at the totality of circumstances. Id.
99. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 890 (citing Dennis v. Sparks. 449 U.S. 24,27 (1980)).
100. Id. at 891 (citations omitted).
101. Id. (citations omitted).

The TransnationalLawyer/ Vol. 11
cooperative action" exists between state and private actors, state action is present.'02
In Unocal, plaintiffs alleged that Unocal worked in concert with SLORC and
MOGE pursuant to the Yadana gas pipeline agreement and were aware of and
benefited from the alleged human rights violations.1 3 This sufficiently confers
subject matter jurisdiction under the ATCA against the private defendants.'0 4
The court next considered potential private liability in the absence of state
action. 0 5 Recognizing this as an unsettled area of the law, the court decided that
violations of some international laws are not limited to state actors, but may be
violated by private parties as well.' 6 The Unocal court analogized allegations of
forced labor to slave trading, which give rise to a violation of international law
capable of being perpetrated by private individuals. 0 7 The court reasoned that since
Unocal paid SLORC to provide labor and security for the Yadana project, it in
effect accepted and approved the use of slave labor. 8 Therefore the court
recognized jurisdiction against the private defendants under the ATCA.'0 9
3. The Act of State DoctrineNot a Bar to Plaintiffs Claims.
After disposing of jurisdictional issues, the court next turned to a prudential
concern, the Act of State doctrine. "° The Act of State doctrine represents judicial
concern with "international comity, respect for the sovereignty of foreign nations
on their own territory, and the avoidance of embarrassment to the Executive Branch
in its conduct of foreign relations."'11 The Unocal court stated that the doctrine "is
limited to situations in which 'the relief sought or the defense interposed require a
court in the U.S. to declare invalid the official act of a foreign sovereign performed
within its own territory.' ' ' 2
Drawing from Ninth Circuit dicta, the court held that the doctrine's application
is inappropriate unless adjudication of the matter will clearly bring the nation into
hostile confrontation with the foreign state." 3 The court concluded that adjudication

102. Id. (citations omitted).
103. Id. at 885.
104. Id. at 891.
105. Id.
106. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 891-92. To be considered a state under international law, there must be
a people, a territory, and a capaity to enter into relations with other states. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726
F.2d 774, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J.,
concurring). Thus, even if a government is not recognized as a state
by the United States, it may still be recognized under this definition. Id.
107. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 892. See supra notes 87-95 and accompanying text (explaining the
development of international trade violations).
108. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 892.
109. Id.
110. il.
111. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400,408 (1990).
112. See Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 893 (quoting from Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics
Corp., 493 U.S. 400,405 (1990)).
113. See id. (citing Republic of Phil. v. Ferdinand Marcos, 862 F2d 1355, 1360 (1988)).
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of the claim is unlikely to lead to hostile confrontation with SLORC since the
Ekecutive and Legislative branches have already expressed their displeasure over
human rights abuses.114
The court next considered "whether the foreign state was acting in the public
interest."" 5 Sovereigns have exclusive control over their natural resources." 6 The
court recognized that the abuses are "connected to decisions regarding allocation
and profit from Burma's national resources.""' 7 Despite these principles, the court
dismissed any argument that SLORC's and MOGE's international human rights
abuses are matters in the public interest. The court continued its analysis by
pointing out that since human rights abuses are internationally denounced, the
foreign state has no authority to claim such acts as "acts of state.1 ... Therefore the
Act of State doctrine did not apply." 9 Still, the court ruled the plaintiffs may only
reach the 20non-state defendants since SLORC and MOGE have sovereign
immunity.
D. Conclusions
The Unocal court had subject-matter jurisdiction under the ATCA as against
defendant Unocal, while it lacked jurisdiction under the FSIA as against SLORC
and MOGE. 1 The court found further that the Act of State doctrine did not bar
adjudication of plaintiff's claims."2
The court had valid jurisdiction under the ATCA since the plaintiffs met the
statutory requirements. The plaintiffs were aliens, alleging torts, in violation of
international law.' 3 In so holding, the court determined that Unocal, a private
company, could violate international law. 24 Thus, the court found a minimal

114. Id. The court noted that the President had issued an Executive Order recognizing human rights abuses
in Myanmar and prohibiting new investment there. Id. See infra part IV.D. (discussing the executive and legislative

response).
115. See Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 893 (quoting from Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1432

(9b Cir. 1989)).
116. Bums H. Weston, The CharterofEconomic Rights and Dutiesof Statesand the Deprivation ofForeign.
owned Wealth, 75 AJ.IL. 437,449 n. 61 (1981).
117. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 893.
118. Id. at 894.
119. Id. at 895.
120. Id. at 893.
121. See supra notes 44-109 and accompanying text (interpreting the Unocal court's opinion regarding
jurisdiction under ATCA and FSIA).
122. See supra notes 110-20 and accompanying text (noting the Unocal court's decision with regard to
application of the Act of State doctrine).
123. See supranote 89 and accompanying text (quoting statutory requirements to state a claim under ATCA).
124. See supra notes 105-109 and accompanying text (relating the Unocal court's discussion of private
actor's liability for violations of international law absent state action under ATCA).
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requirement of state action. Further, its holding required a foundational
interpretation that allegations of forced labor were equivalent to slave trading. 1'
The court's conclusion that SLORC and MOGE were immune from suit under
the FSIA rested on its determination that their joint venture with Unocal and the
torts arising from the venture did not sufficiently establish a "commercial activity"
and thus come under an exception to the Act. 26 Of primary importance was the
determination that the venture caused no direct effects in the U.S.127 Finally, the
court held that the Act of State doctrine did not bar adjudication
of plaintiffs claim
1 28
as Myanmar had no sovereign right to torture its citizens.
The court summarily noted that though SLORC and MOGE are immune from
suit under FSIA, they are not indispensable parties.1 29 As long as plaintiffs can
prove that Unocal, and SLORC and MOGE, are joint tortfeasors, relief still may be
accorded through the parties remaining in the suit. 30
Im. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS

A. UnprecedentedExpansion of Alien Tort Claims Act
1.

ForeignPolicy Implications

Much of the world must face limited politico-judicial protections, particularly
citizens of third world nations.3 1 A developing nation, usually bereft of economic
activity, and hence of tax revenues, typically possesses neither the capital nor the
technological expertise to develop its natural resources. 32 Recognizing this,
developing countries use economic incentives and market principles to attract direct
foreign investment ("DFI"). For the host nation such investment generates hard
currency, provides jobs for its citizens, and usually provides for an export com-

125. See id.; see also infra part IV.A.2.(discussing the implications of expanding the ATCA find a private
party acting under color of law by participating in a joint venture with a foreign state).
126. See supra notes 63-75 and accompanying text (examining the commercial activity exception under
FSIA).
127. See supranotes 81-86 and accompanying text (defining "direct effect" under FSIA).
128. See supranotes 115-19 and accompanying text (discussing Unocal court's determination that the Act
of State doctrine did not apply).
129. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 889.
130. Id.
131. See David Ziskind, The LaborLaws of the Third World, 1 COMP. LAB. L. 59,62-65 (1976) (describing
characteristics that many third world countries share, for example, extensive poverty, high population growth, and
authoritarian government).
132. Id.
133. See Ellinidis,supra note 2, at 307 (describing DFIas the "most expedient and efficient method to benefit
[a] growing economy").
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modity.' 34 Moreover, without such investment, such nations
would go largely
135
undeveloped, leaving their people in economic despair.

Incentives manifest in a variety of forms.

36 First,

many nations provide for

expatriation of profits, wherein the foreign investor can take his profits out of the
country with minimal restrictions. 137 Second, many nations provide favorable tax

treatments, including exemptions or tax-free interest loans to attract DFI. 38 Finally,
developing nations vary in their approach to labor requirements for foreign
investors. 139
With this background in mind, expansion of the ATCA to hold private com-

panies liable for torts committed by a foreign government places U.S. multinational
corporations at a distinct disadvantage. While ostensibly allowed to participate in

the economic affairs of the third world nation (i.e., no adverse State Department or
congressional prohibitions), the multinationals now 4must
shoulder the added burden
0
of exposure to tort liability for their participation.t
Unocal would require U.S. district court judges to enter the foreign policy
arena, dictating by judicial decision and certainly not by reasoned foreign policy
goals. The multinational corporation must choose to either participate in the

development of a third world nation with the potential for liability for tortious acts
committed by the government, or to not participate at all.
2. Legal ReasoningImplications
Unocal provided jurisdiction under the ATCA against Unocal based on its
definition of "state actor."' 41 The "state action" requirement under the ATCA is the
same as the "under color of law" requirement of § 1983 claims.1 42 To state a claim

under § 1983, a plaintiff must show (1) the defendant deprived him of a constitutionally or statutorily protected right; and (2) the defendant deprived him of this

right by acting "under color of law."'143 Acting "under color of law" is conduct
134. INGRIDDEI'ERDELUPiS,FINANEANDPROTECrIONOFDNES R
INDEVELOPINGCOUNTRES 51-54
(2d Ed. 1987).
135. See Ellinidis, supra note 2, at 307-08 (stating that economic growth stimulated by DFI benefits the host
country's standard of living, as well as increases the skills of the local labor force).
136. DELUPIS, supra note 134, at 2.
137. Id at 16.
138. Id. at 18.
139. Id. While some countries are more restrictive and require all employees to be local citizens, other
countries have more relaxed policies and allow specialized employees to be brought in and have a policy giving
preference to locals when they meet the investors criteria. Id. at 21.
140. See supranotes 96-109 and accompanying text (outlining the requirement, or lack thereof, for state
action in finding liability for violations of international law under ATCA).
141. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 890-892.
142. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 930 (1982) and United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787,
794 n.7 (1966) (stating that the "under color of law" language and the "state action" language have been subject
to the same analysis by the courts).
143. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
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performed by a private party with significant state aid or in conjunction with state
officials.14 In Unocal, the plaintiffs did not allege that Unocal or its employees or
executives participated in the forced labor, only that Unocal's joint venture
agreement obligated SLORC to provide labor for the Yadana gas pipeline project.14
Such an arrangement is common in joint ventures with underdeveloped nations in
the development of the host nation's national resource, as discussed supra.1 4
More disturbing still is the surprising alacrity and lack of sound legal reasoning
from which the courtjumps from forced labor to slave trading. The court recognized
that private individuals are not liable for torture under international law,1 47 while
they may be liable for slave trade. 141 The court then concludes that allegations of
forced labor are sufficient to find slave trading.1 49 Slave trading is defined as the
"buying and selling of slaves for profit.' 5 0 Despite this definition, the court recognized that there are no allegations of "physically selling Burmese citizens to the
private defendants." ' The entire basis for recognizing jurisdiction against Unocal
under the ATCA thus rests on the court's finding that forced labor is equivalent to
slave trading, even absent allegations of selling or buying citizens. This is an
example of an activist court searching to find liability for aggrieved plaintiffs and
distorting the facts and the law to fit that aim. t52
B. FindingofNo CommercialActivity Under ForeignSovereignImmunity Act
Insulates Myanmar Governmentfrom Liability
The court found SLORC immune from liability in United States courts under
the FSIA by concluding that SLORC is not participating in a commercial activity."'
A finding that SLORC engaged in a commercial activity would encourage oppressive governments to act more humanely. Unfortunately, in Unocal,SLORC would
still not fall within the commercial activity exception since there were no direct
effects in the U.S.

144. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 244 (2d Cir. 1995). See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text
(discussing state action requirements).

145. Id. at 885.
146. See supra notes 3, 9-10 and accompanying text (describing common business arrangements in
developing countries).
147. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 891.

148. Id. at 892.
149. Id.
150. BLACK'S LAWDICTONARY 1388 (6th Ed. 1990).
151. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 892.
152. See infra notes 166-67 and accompanying text (maintaining that the Unocal court is selectively
characterizing alleged torts to fit desired outcome).
153. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 888, 893. See supra notes 63-75 and accompanying text (examining the
commercial activity exception to FSIA and its application to facts of Doe v. Unocal).
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Saudi Arabia v. Nelson supports an interpretation finding commercial
activity. 54 There, the concurring justices found a commercial activity in the
operation of a public hospital. 155 Here, commercial activity could be found in the
5 6
joint operation of the pipeline development project between SLORC and Unocal.
The Nelson concurrence drew support from House and Senate reports
accompanying the FSIA legislation, which stated that "'a foreign government's ...
employment or engagement of laborers ....
would be among those included within'
the definition of commercial activity."' 57 The drafters clearly intended to deny
immunity based on facts found in Unocal. Essentially SLORC used its sovereign
position to shift responsibility to the private party.55 Nevertheless, since there is no
direct effect in the U.S., SLORC and MOGE avoid responsibility.
Additionally, there is a flaw in the courts "direct effects" analysis, though not
in its result. The Unocal court properly adopted the immediate consequences test
outlined by the Supreme Court in Republic ofArgentina v. Weltover, though it also
used language from the "legally significant acts" test. 59 In Weltover, the Supreme
Court held that to establish a "direct effect" there is no requirement of "substantiality" or "foreseeability."' 16 The FSIA merely requires that the effect follow
"as an immediate consequence of the defendant's activity."' 6' However, the Unocal
court went on to adopt a statement in Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina
62
which holds that "mere financial loss" is not enough to establish a direct effect.'
This statement does not necessarily follow under the immediate consequences test
since it was derived from the substantiality or foreseeability test expressly rejected
by the Supreme Court. In determining that the direct effect element is not satisfied,
the court's reliance on the mere financial loss statement is inappropriate. The court
should have analyzed the facts strictly under the immediate consequences test of
Weltover. The court's confusion, while not affecting the outcome of the case,
creates precedent founded on inaccurate application and interpretation of the tests.
Further evidence that the court selectively used facts to craft a particular result
is evident in the different characterization of the alleged torts as against the
governmental and private defendants. Under the FSIA, the court held that the
"enslave[ment of] farmers" is carried out through SLORC's police power and is

154. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 364 (1993).
155. lId
156. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 887.
157. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 365 (1993) (White, J., concurring).
158. See id. at 366 n.2 (White, J., concurring) ("there is no justification in modem international law for
allowing the foreign state to avoid the economic costs of... the accidents which it may cause") (internal quotations

omitted).
159. Unocal Corp., 963 F.Supp. at 888.
160. Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992).
161. Id.

162. See Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d 699, 710 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Doe v. Unocal
Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 888 (D. Cal. 1997).
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thus "peculiarly sovereign in nature. ' 63 Conversely, under the ATCA, the court
recognized slave labor as an international law which does not require state action
and can be violated by private individuals." The Unocalcourt only aids SLORC's
to the private defendants by improperly characterizing
attempt to shift responsibility
16
the alleged torts. .
C. Hostile Confrontation Requirement UnnecessarilyRead into Act of State
Doctrine
The court in Doe v. Unocal unnecessarily expanded the application of the Act
of State doctrine. The Act of State doctrine's purpose is to prevent justiciability of
sovereign acts of foreign states in U.S. courts, thereby promoting separation of
powers. The judicial department thus properly defers foreign policy functions to the
executive and legislative branches.' 66
The Act of State doctrine recognizes that the courts neither belong, nor are
qualified, to act in the political arena.1 67 There is much more to an analysis of the
ramifications of such adjudication than the district court seems fit to interpose. The
Unocal courts' adoption of Ninth Circuit dicta, and further extrapolation from it,
whereupon it imposes a "hostile confrontation" requirement, has no precedent, nor
is it required to achieve the same result.168 The Unocal court construes foreign
policy so narrowly that only the threat of a military or a similarly hostile response
would preclude adjudication of foreign state acts in U.S. courts. 169 The analysis is
predicated on the simple but grossly misguided question of whether or not adjudication would give rise to "hostile confrontation."'' 70 The Unocal court's decision
will do more harm to the long term interests of the U.S., its companies and its
people, than any intended good for the aggrieved individuals of the third world
nation.

163. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 888.
164. Id. at 890-92.
165. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (emphasizing that foreign states should take responsibility
for their actions in violation of international law).
166. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 802 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring)
(stating that the Supreme Court has recognized that a primary reason for the doctrine is the separation of powers.
167. See ial (Robb, J., concurring) (stating "The conduct of foreign affairs has never been accepted as a
general area of judicial competence."). But see Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964)
(recognizing that it may be appropriate for courts to act if faced with a matter on which there is international
consensus, as the court will be able to apply solid principles).
168. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 893. The Supreme Court has not recognized a "hostile confrontation"
requirement. Id. See generally Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400 (1990)
(discussing the act of state doctrine); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (noting the
historical development of act of state jurisprudence).

169. Id.
170. Id.
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D. Executive and Legislative Response
The executive and legislative branches have responded to the situation in

Myanmar. In recognition of the human rights abuses by SLORC, President Clinton
signed an executive order prohibiting new investment in the country."' Uncertainty
exists as to whether current business projects may continue, or whether all new
investment is prohibited.172 The U.S. historically used such measures when 73a
government's policies are antithetical to democratic notions espoused by the U.S.

Sanctions have effectively been used against South Africa, China, and a host of
other governments with histories of subverting democracy.

74

The federal government is not alone in implementing sanctions against
Myanmar. Municipalities and states are becoming pro-active, apparently dissatisfied

with U.S. foreign policy. 75 Many have enacted various "selective purchasing agreements" and boycotts of companies doing business with Myanmar. 76 Most states
find that leveling sanctions is effective. Sanctions usually consist of a "selective

purchasing law" whereby the government refuses to do business77with a company

or a country that invests or does business in a particular nation.1
While these types of boycotts, sanctions, and official condemnations are
valuable to express outrage at SLORC's oppressive practices, they do not improve
the political conditions for the citizens of Myanmar. One way to encourage democratic reforms within Myanmar and other oppressive governments is to encourage

171. Exec. Order No. 13047, 62 Fed. Reg. 28,301 (1997).
172. Of particular concern to businesses investing in southeast Asia is that Myanmar recently became a
member of ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Burma
Admitted to ASEAN, ForeignMinistersignsProtocol,July 25, 1997. Therefore, doing business in any member state
of ASEAN may involve some type of "new investment" in Myanmar, and may be prohibited under the order.
Evelyn Iritani, Some See Wide Net Castby Ban on Myanmar, L.A. TIMES, May 24, 1997, at D1.
173. MALLOY, supra note 14, at 626-27.
174. See generally id. (discussing the effectiveness of economic sanctions).
175. See David Schmahmann and James Finch, The Unconstitutionalityof State and Local Enactments In
the United States Restricting Business Ties with Burma (Myanmar), 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 175, 177 (1997)
(mentioning several state municipalities and the acts they have taken in response to apartheid in South Africa, for
example).
176. Theo Emery, State with Foreign Policy Roils Trade Beyond Seas, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 21, 1997, at
DI.
177. Eric Young, State LegislatorsMull Economic Sanctions, SACRAmENTO BEE, Oct. 29, 1997, at Cl.
Exemplifying these efforts is a law recently enacted in Massachusetts which states that "a state agency, a state
authority, the house of representatives or the senate may not procure goods or services from any person on the
restricted purchase list." MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 7, § 22H (Law. Co-op. 1997). The statute then specifies that "all
persons currently doing business with Burma (Myanmar)" are to be on the list. Id. at § 22J. Citing this law as a
factor, thirteen companies stopped doing business in Myanmar. Emery, supranote 176, at DI. Thus, it seems the
businesses investing in these foreign countries have been responsive to these measures. Id. However, the
intervention of states into the foreign policy realm is beginning to have an adverse effect. For example, the EU is
now suing the United States, saying that Massachusetts' selective purchase law is in contravention of United States'
obligations under its membership in the WTO. Id. Japan, EU Challenge Massachusetts' Law on Myanmar Trade,
Asian Economic News, Oct. 6, 1997.
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U.S. multinational corporations to invest in the country.178 The President exercised
his executive powers in prohibiting "new" investment in Myanmar, which reflects
intolerance of human rights abuses, while allowing existing businesses to continue
influencing change internally. 179 The President has at his disposal countless experts
in the area of foreign policy upon which he bases his decision. Such tools are an
invaluable resource in navigating the delicate waters of foreign policy. Without
such tools the district court judge, relying on a law clerk and newly created
precedent alone, may find himself conducting foreign policy by the hip of his casebook. That is not the proper exercise of judicial authority.t"' This court exercised
its judicial power in determining that private companies may be held to answer for
tortious conduct of a foreign government joint venturer, a decision that may very
well squelch "existing" investment in Myanmar. Thus the Unocal court, too,
exercised powers over foreign policy.
IV. CONCLUSION

Multinational companies already face the risks endemic to investing in a foreign
nation with an authoritarian-type government.' Under the reasoning adopted by
the court in Unocal, U.S. multinational corporations face an even greater risk in
their home country. By simultaneously restricting application of the FSIA while expanding application of the ATCA, the court created a solution that does little to
solve the underlying problem: torture and abuse of foreign citizens by their government.
The expansion of the ATCA to hold private parties responsible for official acts
of a government it does business with is antithetical to Western notions of apportioning fault and liability. There were no allegations of Unocal employees encouraging or participating in the forced labor of Burmese citizens. The mere fact
that such practices may have happened during performance of a contract with
SLORC should not be enough to subject a U.S. multinational to liability. Entering
a contract to develop a natural resource of a country is a commercial activity, and

178. See Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 895 n.17 (recognizing that "the coordinate branches of government
have simply indicated an intention to encourage reform by allowing companies from the United States to assert
positive pressure on SLORC through their investments in Burma").
179. See supra notes 171-74, 178 and accompanying text (discussing President Clinton's Executive Order
and determination to allow existing businesses to remain in Myanmar).
180. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 802-803 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.
concurring) (discussing judicial abstention from foreign policy); see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726
F.2d 774, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Robb, J. concurring) ("[I]nternational 'law,' or the absence thereof, renders even
the search for the leastcommon denominators of civilized conduct in this area an impossible-to-accomplish judicial

task").
181. See Ellinidis, supra note 2, at 310-12 (discussing the political, legal, and socio-cultural dangers faced
by investors in third-world countries). Ellinidis also discusses specific risks multinational investors may face, such
as political insurrection and inconvertibility of currency. Id. at 313-16.
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hence the government should not be shielded from liability under the FSIA or the
Act of State doctrine.
The court's expansion of a private company's liablity under the ATCA will add
further risk to multinational corporations investing in third world nations.
Encouragement of democratic reforms through direct foreign investment will lessen
as the risks begin to heavily outweigh the benefits. The U.S. government effectively
12
dealt with human rights abuses through implementation of economic sanctions.
In the long run, this avenue offers the greater potential for success by involving a
branch of government that can do something the district court cannot do: respond
directly to the actions of the foreign nation.

182. See supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text (noting implementation of sanctions against Myanmar);
see also Country Reports And U.S. Policies On Human Rights Practices For 1997, Before the Subcommittee On
International Operations And Human Rights of the House International Relations Committee, February 3, 1998
(Prepared Testimony of John Shattuck, Assistant Secretary of State For Democracy, Human Rights And Labor)
(providing an extensive debriefing about the steps that Congress and the Executive branch are taking to raise
consciousness about human rights abuses).

